House Standing Committee on National Defence (NDDN) Binder - October 21, 2025

Table of contents

• Narrative
  • Key messages
  • OAG Report on network cybersecurity
  • Bill C-2, Strong Borders Act (Lawful Access)
  • Bill C-8, An Act Respecting Cyber Security
  • Defence industrial strategy
  • BOREALIS
  • Defence investments & digital sovereignty
  • Cyber incidents
    • House of Commons
    • Airports
  • Top cyber security messages
    • Diversification
    • Multilateral cyber security collaboration agreement between FPT Partners
  • Arctic sovereignty and security
  • Border security
  • Canada - U.S. Relations
  • U.S. Government furlough
• Committee dashboard
  • About the committee (mandate)
  • About the appearance (background)
  • Environmental scan
  • Top party issues
  • Recent party positions

Narrative

Key messages

• CSE is a stand-alone agency and a member of the defence portfolio, reporting directly to the Minister of National Defence.
• CSE includes the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) - Canada’s world-renowned lead agency in cyber security and information assurance.
• CSE collects foreign signals intelligence (SIGINT) in line with Cabinet-approved Intelligence Priorities to inform the Government of Canada’s decision making and protect national security.
  • These priorities include economic security, diplomatic affairs, violent extremism, foreign interference, cyber threats, Arctic sovereignty, support to military operations, and more.
• CSE’s five-part mandate is detailed in the Communications Security Establishment Act (CSE Act), specifically:
  • foreign signals intelligence
  • cyber security and information assurance
  • active cyber operations
  • defensive cyber operations
  • technical and operational assistance to federal partners
• CSE also provides assistance to federal law enforcement and security organizations in their legally authorized activities.

OAG Audit on Department Performance – network cybersecurity

The Office of the Auditor General recently conducted a performance audit of Network Cyber Security to assess whether effective governance structures and technical tools are in place to protect and defend the government against cyber threats.

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS) and Shared Services Canada (SSC) are the main leads on the recommendations.

The audit makes three recommendations that implicate the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSE).

Notably, the audit emphasized the need for stronger collaboration between government departments on cyber incidents and raised concern that not all government departments have adopted CSE’s cyber defence sensors.

• In today’s ever-changing threat landscape, securing Canada’s IT infrastructure is more important than ever.
• The Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSE) welcomes the release of the OAG’s report on the Performance Audit of Cybersecurity of Federal Government Networks and Systems.
• CSE welcomes the recommendations of the Auditor General and remains committed to working collaboratively with TBS and SSC to strengthen the security and resilience of the Government of Canada’s (GC) digital infrastructure.
• Cyber security is a team effort and we’re continuously looking for ways to improve the GC’s resilience in this rapidly changing cyber landscape.
• CSE’s Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) works closely with our GC partners to help protect our networks and systems and to mitigate the impacts of cyber incidents.
• CSE has a globally recognized sensors program that can be deployed to any federal department or agency, including Crown corporations, upon request.
• Many federal organizations are responsible for managing their own IT infrastructure, but they can still opt to use CSE’s cyber defence sensors program or seek advice and guidance from the Cyber Centre on how to best defend their networks.
• CSE supports TBS in working with federal organizations to identify and gather information on unknown IT devices and systems, including their associated vulnerabilities, through methods like the CSE cyber defence sensor program.
• In collaboration with SSC, CSE will work towards establishing a GC-wide cyber security event collaboration platform and incident case management tool to enable seamless collaboration when managing GC response to cyber events. This work will include support for centralized information sharing and tracking of internal GC mitigation efforts during a GC cyber security event for both central agencies and GC organizations. In the interim, CSE continues to analyze daily cyber perimeter security events to help protect Government of Canada networks and systems.
• CSE continues to collaborate with TBS and SSC to strengthen the GC’s collective response to cyber threats by improving incident management frameworks and protocols. This partnership ensures that roles, responsibilities, and escalation paths are clearly defined and understood across departments.
• CSE will also continue to support TBS and SSC in reviewing and updating cyber incident management policies to reflect evolving threat landscapes and best practice, integrating lessons learned from past incidents and aligning with international standards.

Bill C-2, Stronger Borders Act, Lawful Access Provisions

[Note: Bill C-12 removes the Lawful Access provisions and has been tabled in the House of Commons.]

CSE believes that strong encryption is critical for overall cyber security on a national level.

In relation to Bill C-2 and Sections 14 and 15, CSE supports our federal partners, and the legislation’s efforts for law enforcement to obtain information they have been legally authorized to have to support their investigations.

• We do not see the lawful access provisions of Bill C-2 as a backdoor, but rather, we believe there are secure and credible ways to create a technical solution to achieve such access without compromising cyber security.
• We remain ready to work with our federal partners and industry should CSE’s cyber security guidance be requested to help ensure a technical solution is secure and protects Canadians’ privacy.

Bill C-8, An Act respecting cyber security, amending the Telecommunications Act and making consequential amendments to other Acts

Bill C-8 introduces security related amendments to the Telecommunications Act and establishes a new cyber security framework intended to bolster the resilience of Canada’s critical cyber systems.

The proposed legislation seeks to secure Canada’s telecommunications system against any threats including those posed by high-risk suppliers in line with the Government’s May 2022 policy statement.

The proposed legislation also re-introduces the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (CCSPA), requiring designated operators in the finance, telecommunications, energy, and transportation sectors to protect their critical cyber systems.

• The role of the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSE) and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) under the CCSPA would be to receive mandatory incident reports from designated operators, and to also provide technical advice, guidance, and services to operators, regulators, the Minister of Public Safety, and other federal departments and agencies with mandates covering these key sectors.
• To do so, CSE would leverage its existing mandate under the Communications Security Establishment Act (CSE Act) for cyber security and information assurance.
• The Cyber Centre already has an established working relationship with industry and critical infrastructure operators, who voluntarily report cyber incidents.
• The CCSPA would allow the Cyber Centre to build on these relationships in a collaborative and more engaged way.
• This Bill is an important step in the process of strengthening Canada’s cyber security.
• Following Royal Assent of the Bill, provisions would be implemented gradually, and ongoing consultation between government and industry stakeholders regarding regulation development would continue in order to minimize potential impact on impacted sectors.

Defence industrial strategy (DIS)

In June 2025, Prime Minister Carney announced $2.1 billion in funding to enhance the Government of Canada’s partnership with Canadian defence industry and to establish a comprehensive Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) that ensures Canada has secure, timely, and reliable access to sovereign capabilities.

These actions focus on immediate needs such as reducing obstacles that limit industry’s ability to provide critical equipment and support to the Canadian Armed Forces.

• CSE will support the Department of National Defence throughout the development phase of the DIS in supporting a thriving Canadian defence industrial ecosystem and fostering partnerships that strengthen Canada’s defence industry.
• CSE is looking forward to these ongoing defence initiatives which seek to strengthen Canada’s defence capabilities, boost research and development, and make it easier for Canadian industry to meet the needs of the Defence Portfolio.

Bureau of Research, Engineering and Advanced Leadership in Science (BOREALIS)

The Bureau of Research, Engineering and Advanced Leadership in Science (BOREALIS) was announced as part of the Liberal Party of Canada’s campaign platform earlier this year with a purpose of accelerating the delivery of cutting-edge capabilities to meet operational needs in defence and security.

BOREALIS responds to the growing consensus that a more strategic, integrated, and mission-driven approach is required to harness research and innovation across government, academia, and industry.

• When established, BOREALIS will take a Team Canada approach to innovation, grounded in cooperation, shared priorities, and delivery.
• BOREALIS seeks to ensure that the Canadian Armed Forces and CSE possess innovative solutions in several areas including artificial intelligence, quantum computing and cybersecurity.
• This initiative will help drive research and development with an emphasis on delivery, agility, and impact.
• One of the core features of BOREALIS will be the establishment of Defence Innovation Secure Hubs, classified spaces where partners can co-develop, test, and validate emerging technologies.

Defence investments and digital sovereignty

Canada is not immune to threats to its digital infrastructure.

As new technologies emerge and our adversaries develop new techniques over time, investments are needed to both leverage these new capabilities and secure our digital infrastructure.

Main estimates

• In this year’s main estimates, CSE sought a total of $1.22 billion. In addition, through Supplementary Estimates A, CSE sought and was granted $370.1 million for a total of $1.59 billion dollars all of which contribute towards reaching the 2% of GDP in defence expenditures this year.
• The Main Estimates include allocating $21 million to enhance foreign intelligence coverage of transnational organized crime and illegal drug supply chains.
• This funding was allocated to CSE to bolster the capacity to provide actionable intelligence to federal partners on foreign transnational criminal actors involved in trafficking of fentanyl, other illicit drugs, and their precursors to North America.
• This funding will also be used to bolster the cyber operations aspect of its mandate to disrupt these illicit supply chains.

Supplementary estimates A – defence investments

On June 9, 2025, the Government of Canada announced funding for the Department of National Defence and the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSE) for enhanced tools, capabilities and digital foundations, to support operations.

• CSE received $370.1 million through Supplementary Estimates A, which contributes toward Canada reaching the 2% of GDP in defence expenditures this year.
• As a key element of the government’s new investments in Canada’s defence, CSE is hardening and modernizing the federal government’s critical systems that encrypt and secure our most sensitive communications, information and operations.
• This important foundational digital investment will enable the delivery of resilient and sovereign Canadian solutions to enhance security, interoperability and integrity of classified operations and services.
• These investments will further allow CSE to expand its capabilities towards timely access to sensitive, mission-critical information, maximizing technological advancements that we know are being used by our adversaries.

Digital sovereignty

Digital sovereignty is about having sufficient control on our foundational infrastructure to maintain a level of resilience and autonomy considering these external factors. As such, digital sovereignty is essential to protecting national interests, ensuring data privacy, and maintaining control over critical digital infrastructure.

Digital sovereignty is not just about security—it’s also about economic opportunity.

• Emerging technologies, artificial intelligence and quantum are critical capabilities Canada needs in support of defence, security, and international affairs goals.
• This important foundational digital investment will enable the delivery of resilient and sovereign Canadian solutions to safeguard the integrity of classified operations and services and provide greater interoperability within Canada and with Five Eyes intelligence partners.
• By investing in sovereign infrastructure and open-source technologies, Canada aims to foster a competitive digital economy that supports Canadian businesses and talent.

The Government of Canada continues to consult with industry leaders to build a digital sovereignty framework that harnesses domestic innovation in its digital solutions.

Cyber Incidents (House of Commons, Airports, *REDACTED* and F5)

House of Commons

On August 14, 2025, media outlets reported that the House of Commons was hit by a cyber incident.

On August 8, 2025, a House of Commons internal investigation confirmed that a threat actor was able to exploit a recent Microsoft critical vulnerability to gain unauthorized access to a technical database containing information used to manage computers and mobile devices. While the House of Commons is investigating the incident with support from national security partners, the nature of the incident and its attribution to specific threat actor have not been disclosed.

In 2024, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between CSE and HoC. The MoU outlined the cyber security services currently offered by the Cyber Centre to the HoC, which includes its Sensors program and Incident Handling support.

In addition, the MoU formalized protocols for managing cyber incidents, sharing critical information, and escalating issues, which helps to ensure clear communication and effective collaboration. Regular bilateral meetings are held to monitor progress, address gaps, and maintain a cooperative relationship.

• The Government of Canada (GC) faces a variety of cyber threats, both sophisticated and opportunistic. Cyber threat actors probe government systems and networks every single day, looking for vulnerabilities and attempting to gain unauthorized access.
• The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (the Cyber Centre), part of the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSE), plays a central role in defending GC systems against these threats.
• While CSE does not typically comment on specific cyber incidents, I can confirm that CSE has been working in close collaboration with the House of Commons administration to provide support.

Airports

• On October 13, 2025, 3 class 2 airports (Victoria, Windsor, Kelowna) had their PA and internal public screens compromised.
• At both Kelowna and Windsor airports, the computer monitors displayed pro-Hamas imagery.
• At all three airports, there was looped Arabic music playing over the PA system.
• Police of jurisdiction are involved at all three airports.

*REDACTED*

Breach at US-based cybersecurity provider F5

• On October 15, 2025, US- based cyber security provider F5 disclosed that a highly sophisticated nation-state threat actor maintained long-term, persistent access to, and downloaded files from, certain F5 systems.
• CSE’s Cyber Centre issued an alert to amplify the statement released by F5.

Responsive lines on cyber incidents

• The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre), a part of the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSE), generally does not comment on specific or alleged cyber security incidents.
• However, we can confirm that we are aware of the situation and are working closely with our Government of Canada partners (and/or international partners depending on the incident).
• We urge all organizations in all critical infrastructure sectors, including transportation, government, healthcare, financial service and technology, to remain vigilant.
• Organizations should review their cyber security posture and follow the technical guidance outlined in the advisory, including applying appropriate patches immediately.
• If they suspect or are experiencing a cyber incident, they should report it through the Cyber Centre’s online portal.
• The Cyber Centre supports government and critical infrastructure providers by sharing:
  • cyber security best practices, including the Top 10 IT security action items and cross-sector Cyber Security Readiness Goals (CRGs)
  • threat bulletins and briefings to assess cyber risks
  • indicators of compromise (IOCs) to detect intrusions
  • notifications such as advisories (routine warnings), alerts (urgent warnings), and cyber flashes (urgent and sensitive warnings)
  • pre-ransomware notifications (over 300 were issued in 2024 alone)
• All Canadians should follow basic Cyber Hygiene:
  • patch and update software and devices
  • use strong, unique passphrases or passwords
  • enable multi-factor authentication
  • stay alert to phishing and spear-phishing attempts
  • store data securely and know your backup procedures

Additional cyber security messages

Protecting Canada’s cyber security is essential for our security, safety, prosperity and competitiveness. That is why the federal government has been working to strengthen our national cyber resilience and helping Canadians adopt cyber security best practices.

Every day, CSE uses sophisticated cyber capabilities to identify and defend against threats to Canada’s systems and networks. CSE’s Canadian Centre for Cyber Security provides Canadians with expert advice and guidance and leads the Government’s response to cyber incidents.

Cyber security is a whole-of-society concern, and the federal government works together with other jurisdictions, small-and-medium enterprises as well as critical infrastructure owners and operators to raise Canada’s cyber security bar.

• In February 2025, the Government of Canada released its new National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS).
• The NCSS articulates Canada’s long-term plan to partner with provinces, territories, law enforcement, industry, Indigenous communities and academia to tackle Canada’s cyber security challenges.
• Under the NCSS, the Government of Canada established the Canadian Cyber Defence Collective (CCDC), a multi-stakeholder engagement body.
  • The CCDC ensures critical infrastructure operators, businesses and everyday Canadians benefit from shared intelligence, innovations and best practices. This initiative strengthens Canada’s ability to detect, prevent and respond to cyberattacks, creating a safer digital landscape for Canadians.

Further, cyber operations capabilities are a key element of military and state power, needed to deter and defeat foreign-based threats to Canada in times of peace and conflict.

Diversification

• Canada already has existing cyber talent, resources, knowledge and tools. Mobilizing this capacity is essential to safeguarding our nation’s collective cyber safety.
• If there is one thing we have learned in cyber security, it is that no one—no agency, no government, no company—can succeed alone. Collaboration is not a nice-to-have, it is the foundation of resilience.
• By cultivating strong, enduring partnerships across all sectors and all levels of government, we position ourselves to meet the evolving challenges of the cyber landscape.
• Diverse partnerships with industry allow the Government to support domestic capacity and enhance global competitiveness, aligning with Canada’s broader economic resilience objectives.
• A diverse supplier and partner ecosystem enables rapid adaptation in the face of emergencies, market disruptions, or geopolitis cal shifts.
• Engaging a wide range of partners, including industry, academia, SMEs, equity‑deserving groups, introduces fresh perspectives and new technologies that improve adaptability and innovation.

Multilateral cyber security collaboration agreement between Federal, Provincial, and Territorial partners

During the Federal, Provincial, and Territorial (FPT) Symposium on Digital Trust and Cyber Security, the federal government along with each provincial and territorial governments, signed a multilateral cyber security collaboration agreement to better protect Canada's critical infrastructure and the personal information of Canadians.

• The agreement aims to prevent and mitigate the consequences of cyber security events that that may affect the confidentiality, integrity or availability of information and information technology.
• The agreement also allows governments to more easily share real-time intelligence on cyber threats, as well as cyber security tools and services for this purpose. They will also be able to share resources to help each other prevent, manage and mitigate cyber threats, and defend against cyber events.
• The agreement resulted from ministerial discussions during the 2024 FPT Symposium which centred on facilitating information sharing to quickly and effectively respond to cyber attacks.

The ministers discussed implementing the agreement, emphasizing increased intergovernmental collaboration to address existing and emerging threats. Ministers also highlighted the importance of organizing a pan-Canadian tabletop exercise to enhance our country's resilience to cyber attacks.

Arctic sovereignty and security

As one of Canada's key security and intelligence organizations, CSE works alongside domestic and international partners in maintaining our Arctic security and sovereignty.

• Throughout the past year, CSE shared 196 intelligence reports on Arctic security with 20 Government of Canada departments and with Canada’s international allies.
• These reports included information on foreign states’ political intentions, military capabilities, technological advancements, economic interests, and research activities in the region.

Moreover, the Cyber Centre deployed sensors to help protect the cyber systems of high-priority non-federal institutions, such as the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Yukon government systems. The Cyber Centre also continues to work with partners in the North such as critical infrastructure providers and other systems of importance including airports and universities to provide advice and guidance and help raise the cyber security bar.

Further, Canada’s new Arctic Foreign Policy cites CSE as a key partner in bridging the intelligence gap to address the complex range of threats facing the Arctic. Partnerships remain critical to our success and, CSE took several steps to deepen ongoing Arctic partnerships, including:

• Supporting the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) as they monitored and tracked threats from foreign adversaries in the Arctic region.
• Continuing to co-chair, alongside the Privy Council Office (PCO), the Arctic Intelligence Coordination Group, which coordinates Arctic security activities across the Government of Canada.
• continuing to participate in and provide leadership at domestic and international conferences and forums concerning Arctic and polar issues; and
• hosting an in-person conference in Ottawa for an international forum on signals intelligence concerning both polar regions.

CSE continues to invest to meet the growing demand for intelligence from a variety of Arctic stakeholders and to advance related partnerships in areas such as cyber defence, economic security and countering foreign interference.

Border security

In December 2024, the Government of Canada released Canada’s Border Plan.

CSE contributes to Canada’s Border Plan through the collection of strategic and actionable foreign intelligence on organized crime and drug networks, particularly the trafficking of fentanyl and its precursors into North America.

CSE also leverages its technical expertise to provide operational assistance to federal law enforcement and security partners on border security priorities. Where appropriate, CSE may conduct foreign cyber operations to disrupt or degrade activities that threaten Canadian and allied security.

• Specifically, the government announced an investment of $180 million over 6 years to expand CSE’s intelligence collection and foreign cyber operations capacity, enabling CSE to target transnational organized crime and fentanyl trafficking more effectively.
• Both foreign intelligence and cyber operations are conducted in close collaboration with domestic and international partners to achieve this priority objective.
• For example, CSE is an active participant in the Joint Operational Intelligence Cell (JOIC), which brings together Canadian security departments and agencies, and law enforcement partners to better protect Canada’s border.
• The JOIC builds on existing cooperation between law enforcement partners and security agencies to enhance the production, analysis, sharing and actioning of intelligence on transnational organized crime, money laundering, and drug trafficking.

Canada and U.S. relations

Canada and the United States share a deep and enduring partnership in intelligence and cyber security.

The Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSE) works closely with U.S. counterparts to align intelligence priorities and strengthen our collective cyber resilience. This includes joint efforts to counter state-sponsored threats, cybercrime, and transnational criminal networks.

• Most recently, in support of Canada’s Border Strategy, CSE has enhanced its foreign intelligence collection on organized crime and drug trafficking networks to help counter threats impacting Canada and the US.
• This intelligence is shared with law enforcement agencies in both countries to disrupt the supply chains of illicit synthetic drugs.

From a cyber security perspective, CSE continues to share timely and valuable threat intelligence with U.S. partners to help defend critical infrastructure and systems of national importance on both sides of the border.

• For example, CSE and the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) regularly issue joint cyber security alerts and advisories to help protect critical infrastructure and inform businesses and governments of emerging threats.

The United States is a valued Five Eyes partner. In 2024–25, CSE endorsed over 20 joint publications with Five Eyes and like-minded partners.

• These publications addressed shared concerns such as cybercrime, artificial intelligence, and threats to critical infrastructure.

Canada and the United States share a longstanding and trusted partnership in defence, intelligence, and cyber security. This relationship is vital to the safety and prosperity of both nations.

Canada’s surveillance and cyber capabilities are essential to the success of NORAD and to the defence of North America, particularly in the Arctic, which is increasingly a region of strategic competition.

U.S. Government furlough

CSE is aware of the U.S. government shutdown and continue to monitor developments. During this period, essential and critical bilateral collaboration continues to proceed as planned, given its mutual value and contribution to the safety of both countries.

• The interconnectedness of our national security communities means we are best placed to protect North American security when we work together.
• CSE maintains a longstanding partnership with the United States and all members of the Five Eyes, the world’s longest-standing intelligence-sharing alliance.
• This relationship with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand supports ongoing collaboration and vigilance, even during periods of domestic disruption.

As always, we encourage Canadian businesses and critical infrastructure operators to remain vigilant by maintaining strong cyber security practices, timely patch management and robust contingency planning. These measures help ensure early detection and resilience against emerging cyber threats.

Committee dashboard

About the committee (mandate)

Mandate

Under its mandate, the Standing Committee on National Defence (NDDN):

• Reviews all matters pertaining to the Department of National Defence (“the department”) and the Canadian Armed Forces. It may examine and report on matters referred to it by the House of Commons or it may undertake studies on its own initiative.
• Examines legislation, activities and expenditures concerning the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, as well as the effectiveness of related policies and programs; and
• Studies topics of interest related to agencies and partners within the Defence Portfolio.

About the appearance (background)

Background

The topic for this appearance will be the Mandate and Priorities of the Minister of National Defence.

The Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSE) will appear alongside the Minister of National Defence.

The Committee members present in the meeting will be allowed to ask questions based on party representation.

The committee will meet for two hours.

Environmental scan

Conservative Party of Canada (CPC)

CPC Committee members:

• James Bezan (Co Vice-Chair)
• Scott Anderson
• Cheryl Gallant
• Jeff Kibble

The Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) members are likely to focus their questions on Border security, cyber security, Bill C-12 and Bill C-8.

In the past, Cheryl Gallant has been aggressive in her line of questioning towards CSE regarding Canada’s cyber security measures, satellite communications, and underwater sea cables.

Cyber threats, foreign interference, misinformation/disinformation and protecting democratic institutions are also points of interest for committee members and may be inquired on.

Bloc Québécois (BQ)

BQ Committee members:

• Simon-Pierre Savard Tremblay (Co Vice-Chair)

The Bloc Québécois (BQ) member is likely to ask about Canada-US relations and the competitiveness of CAF’s Cyber Command compared to allies. The member may also be interested in cyber security and privacy protections relations to C-8.

Liberal Party of Canada (LPC)

LPC Committee members:

• Charles Sousa (Chair)
• Viviane Lapointe
• Chris Malette
• Sherry Romanado
• Tim Watchorn

The Liberal Party of Canada (LPC) members may be interested in overall cyber security, support to the CAF, Ukraine, NATO partners, and it is reasonable to expect that privacy concerns related to Bill C-8 and Bill C-12 may resonate with some caucus members.

Top party issues

Conservative Party of Canada

Cyber defence funding and readiness

• Questioning whether Canada invests sufficiently in cyber capabilities compared to allies.
• Pressing for more advanced technologies, mandatory incident reporting, and stronger safeguards across government.

Accountability and transparency

• Raising concerns about lapsed funding, government data breaches, and inadequate disclosure of cyber threats.
• Challenging the government on broken public campaign links and transparency on foreign interference.

CAF support and equipment

• Highlighting supply issues, including ammunition and equipment shortages for CAF members.
• Raising concerns about accommodations for service members.

Foreign interference and security

• Pressing on state-sponsored threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
• Emphasizing the need to secure elections against foreign interference.

Bloc Quebecois

CAF Cyber Command and credibility

• Questioning whether the creation of CAF Cyber Command adds value or simply reallocates resources.
• Pressing on how the command improves Canada’s competitiveness and credibility compared to allies.

Oversight and investigations

• Raising concerns about past defence leadership decisions, including Minister Sajjan’s handling of Afghan evacuations.
• Seeking assurances that processes are transparent and strengthen Canada’s credibility internationally.

Liberal Party of Canada

Protecting democratic institutions

• Focusing on threats to Canada’s democracy from cyber operations, mis/disinformation, and foreign actors.
• Stressing the importance of coordination with allies, including NATO and Five Eyes, to counter threats.

Emerging technology and AI

• Highlighting opportunities and risks in AI and quantum computing, calling for ethical use in defence.
• Emphasizing responsible international cooperation and investment in research and development.

Recruitment and retention

• Noting ongoing challenges in CAF recruitment and culture change, and the need to modernize capabilities.

Public awareness and disinformation

• Supporting CSE’s public awareness campaigns against misinformation and disinformation targeting Canadians.

Recent party positions

Conservative Party of Canada

Border security

• In recent Question Periods, Conservative members have repeatedly inquired about the Liberal government’s promise to hire 1,000 new CBSA officers and 1,000 RCMP officers.
• Conservative members expressed grave concern over a lack of privacy protections in the former Bill C-2 Strong Borders Act (now known as Bill C-12 Strengthening Canada’s Immigration System and Borders Act). Bill C-12 mirrors Bill C-2 with some clauses removed, including those disputed by the Conservatives, which allowed Canada Post to open mail and law enforcement to access some digital data (lawful access).

Bill C-8 An Act Respecting Cybersecurity

• Many Conservative members have expressed privacy concerns in Bill C-8 and have even stated that several sections of the bill infringe on Canadians’ Charter rights. However, they recognize the importance of having cybersecurity legislation and have said they will work hard to improve the bill with amendments that prevent any violation of Charter rights.
• Frank Caputo (CPC) has raised concerns regarding insufficient time allotted to study Bill C-8 An Act Respecting Cybersecurity. He emphasized the importance of having sufficient time to thoroughly examine the bill, preferably more than three meetings to hear from a broad range of subject matter experts, given the complexity and sensitivity of cybersecurity issues.

Bloc Quebecois

Bill C-8 An Act Respecting Cybersecurity

• Simon-Pierre Savard Tremblay (BQ) has voiced his concern over privacy risks and potential federal overreach in Bill C-8, as it does not fully prevent access to Canadians’ old emails or web searches. They have stressed the need for thorough committee study, with witnesses and experts, to refine the bill and strengthen privacy protections for Canadians.

Cybersecurity and foreign interference

• Simon-Pierre Savard Tremblay (BQ) warned of security risks from Chinese technology tied to the Communist Party, citing CSIS, RCMP, and allied bans on Huawei and TikTok. He urged excluding Chinese tech from sensitive domains, noting secure 5G alternatives exist.

Border security

• During the Public Safety Minister’s recent SECU appearance, the BQ raised concerns that Canada’s border remains porous due to a shortage of CBSA officers, questioned delays in hiring 1,000 new agents, and raised concerns about training capacity.
• BQ members have called for a dedicated Border Minister, criticized slow implementation of Bill C-70 (lack of registry and Transparency Commissioner), and raised security risks tied to firearms.

Liberal Party of Canada

Bill C-8 An Act Respecting Cybersecurity

• Amid privacy and potential overreach concerns expressed by opposition parties and civil liberties groups, the Minister of Public Safety tabled Bill C-12, An Act respecting certain measures relating to the security of Canada’s borders and the integrity of the Canadian immigration system and respecting other related security measures on October 8th, 2025. Bill C-12 mirrors Bill C-2 the Strong Borders Act with some clauses removed. Clauses that have been removed in Bill include those that allowed Canada Post to open mail and law enforcement to access some digital data (lawful access).

Lawful access and border security (Bill C-12)

• During the Public Safety Minister’s recent SECU appearance, he acknowledged that Bill C-2 (The Strong Borders Act) attempted to address lawful access, but its removal from Bill C-12 (Strengthening Canada’s Immigration System and Borders Act) disappointed many law enforcement stakeholders.
• He then committed to introducing lawful access legislation that complies with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and reaffirmed the government’s intention to reintroduce provisions from Bill C-2 that were excluded from Bill C-12.