COTS Security Guidance (CSG--10\S) -- Summary Of Overview Of Operating System Security Features
Published date: August 2009
Table of Contents
- Foreword
- Effective Date
- Annex A – Summary of Recommendations
- Annex B – Security Services Vulnerabilities, Threats and Risks
- Annex C – Security Features Checklist for Operating Systems
- Table 1: LINUX Security Services Vulnerabilities,Threats and Risks
- Table 2: Mac OS Security Services Vulnerabilities,Threats and Risks
- Table 3: WINDOWS Security Services Vulnerabilities,Threats and Risks
- Table 4: Security Recommendations – LINUX
- Table 5: Security Recommendations – Mac OS X
- Table 6: Security Recommendations – WINDOWS
- List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
Foreword
The Summary of Secure use of Operating System (CSG–10\S) is an unclassified publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC).
Suggestions for amendments should be forwarded through departmental communications security channels to your Client Services Representative at CSEC.
For further information, please contact CSEC's ITS Client Services area by e–mail at itsclientservices@cse–cst.gc.ca or call 613-991–7654.
Effective Date
This publication takes effect on 08/28/2009.
Carey Frey
Director, IT Security Program
© Government of Canada, Communications Security Establishment Canada 2009.
It is not permissible to make copies or extracts from this publication without the written consent of CSEC.
Annex A – Summary of Recommendations
| Mitigation | Policy |
|---|---|
| Include Desktop OS in security planning and implementation | Include the desktop OS in IT security program and contingency planning |
| Disable all unnecessary features | The IT department is responsible for the protection and maintenance |
| Change default passwords | Require that there be no unauthorized access |
| Allow only the necessary traffic between the device and a minimum set of trusted addresses | Require authentication for all activities |
| Require that all IT devices be certified before connection to any network | Define acceptable use policy and make users aware through training |
| Encrypt data communications | Enforce least privileges |
| Log all activities extensively | Require periodic security audits |
| Prevent tampering with audit logs | Require security certification before allowing desktop OS on the network |
| Employ strong user I&A (e.g., two–factor) | Prohibit the unauthorized copying of sensitive documents |
| Apply least privileges to users | Prohibit unauthorized external access |
| Apply the latest software updates and security patches | Require extensive logging of all activities on network devices |
| Establish thorough change management and auditing programs | Require anti–virus and software updating for all networked devices |
| Use SNMPv3 for centralized management | Prohibit unauthorized network sniffing |
| Protect the devices physically | Require that IT technology be selected for appropriate security |
| Require that anyone accessing the device be identified and authorized |
Annex B – Security Services Vulnerabilities, Threats and Risks
Table 1 below identify the vulnerabilities, threats and risks associated with LINUX OS.
Table 1: LINUX Security Services Vulnerabilities,Threats and Risks
| Security Services | Vulnerabilities | Threats | Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identification and Authentication | Account/Authentication Configuration using weak encryption and lack of separation between user names and associated passwords |
|
|
| Identification and Authentication | Lack of hardening of the GRUB/LILO:
|
Hacker exploitation through weak passwords to gain access to workstation and/or Network. |
|
| Authorization | Weak file System Security contributes to:
|
Hacker exploitation of workstation and/or Network services. |
|
| Authorization | Weak File/Print Security contributed by: | Hacker exploitation of workstation and/or Network services. |
|
| Access Control | Firewall installation with default/insufficient parameters attributes to overall weakness for compromise to systems confidentiality, Integrity and availability of the workstation and its information assets. | Hacker compromises workstation through weak firewall settings. |
|
| Access Control | No restriction on remote 'root' login. | Hacker compromises workstation through remote login. |
|
| Access Control |
|
Hacker compromises workstation through known vulnerabilities in default settings. |
|
| Access Control | Weak or no password used to Protect Single–user Mode. | Hacker compromises workstation through known vulnerabilities in default settings. |
|
| Access Control | Open System Accounts: Accounts used for system services and/or daemon are allowed to login interactively. | Hacker compromises workstation through known vulnerabilities in default settings |
|
| Access Control | TCP Wrapper running with default configuration and accessible to all users. | Hacker compromises workstation through known vulnerabilities in default service settings |
|
| Access Control | Scheduler Security: Xinetd enabled and can result in threats originating from telnet, rlogin, wu–ftpd or tftp. | Hacker compromises workstation through known vulnerabilities in default service settings |
|
| Access Control | Weakness in Web Security configuration:
|
Hacker compromises workstation through known vulnerabilities in default Web service settings |
|
| Confidentiality | Accounts created that are not password protected (empty) facilitates access to systems operating system. | External threat agents can gain easy access to information and resources through empty passwords on default accounts |
|
| Confidentiality | Weak password policy governing user Account Limits and lengthy password age. | External threat agents can use this to use 'brute force' type attacks to break and gain access to system |
|
| Confidentiality | Sendmail Daemon Mode enabled may Sendmail daemon mode enabled may be used to propagate malware and spam. | A hacker may compromise systems security to enable Sendmail Daemon to disclose data or propagate malicious code. |
|
| Confidentiality | Weak DNS Security:
|
Network exploitation by a hacker sniffing network for vulnerabilities. |
|
| Integrity | Disabling automated updates service increases risk for compromise through OS weaknesses. | Desktops not configured to use automatic updates via 'up2date' service will leave environment vulnerable to unmitigated known security holes, which hackers can exploit to compromise systems. |
|
| Availability | Partitioning | Lack of strict permission on partition off directories is likely to result in DoS type attacks. |
|
| Availability | Lack of hardening of startup services exposes the environment to threats exploiting unwanted services. | Hacker compromises workstation through known vulnerabilities in enabled startup services. |
|
| Accountability | Accounts have empty passwords | External threat agents can gain easy access to information and resources through empty passwords on default accounts | Unauthorized access |
| Accountability | Default logging results in insufficient information and event audit. | Malicious activity may go undetected for a prolonged period. | Unauthorized access |
| Non–Repudiation | Unnecessary Accounts resident on workstation are prone to compromise through brute force. | Unnecessary user accounts and groups used by threat agents to gain access |
|
| Non–Repudiation | Audit and logging information lacks accurate time | No synchronization of the system clock with your departments trusted time source(s) can result in operational errors and auditing issues |
|
Table 2 below identify the vulnerabilities, threats and risks associated with Mac OS.
Table 2: Mac OS Security Services Vulnerabilities,Threats and Risks
| Security Services | Vulnerabilities | Threat | Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identification and Authentication | Password reset using bootable Mac OS X CD media | Unauthorized access through reset password |
|
| Identification and Authentication | Use of 'guest' accounts to access other users file or install cron jobs | Malware type infection attacks by via cron jobs |
|
| Identification and Authentication | "Single User Mode (SUM)' circumvents DAC | 'root[4]' level access imparted without authentication |
|
| Identification and Authentication | 'Automatically Log In' is enabled on startup | Access to Mac OS X without any I&A challenge response validation |
|
| Identification and Authentication | Using 'ypcat password' or 'nidump passwd' type exploits in NIS domain | Access to user accounts and password |
|
| Identification and Authentication | Weak password policy | Facilitates hackers ability to compromise through weak passwords on user accounts |
|
| Authorization | DAC circumvented when Mac OS X is booted in SUM | Unauthorized access to gain 'root' level access | Unauthorized access; |
| Authorization | "root' user enabled | Unauthorized access gained and privileges elevated by threat agents | Unauthorized access; |
| Authorization | The initial account used to administer the system, as well as any accounts created prior to changing the umask, allows all users read access to the files in their home folders, public, sites and drop folders. | Unauthorized access gained and privileges elevated by threat agents | Unauthorized access; |
| Authorization | Use of remote management[5] allowed for all users to control Mac OS X using Apple's remote management application. This feature is similar in some way to the screen sharing function but with the added ability to control the Mac. | Unauthorized access gained and privileges elevated by threat agents | Unauthorized access; |
| Access Control | All default user accounts are administrative accounts | Unauthorized access to information and resources |
|
| Access Control | Failure to disable root user facilitates extract of sensitive information from a NetInfo directory | Unauthorized access to executables |
|
| Access Control | Case–insensitive nature of HFS+ with respect to security resulting from dependencies built into application code | Unauthorized access to executables |
|
| Access Control | Improper Set–UID bit (SUID) or set–GID bit (SGID) on executables | Unauthorized access to executables through group membership |
|
| Access Control | Lack of Firmware Password protection results in
|
Unauthorized access can be gained by the threat agents using the vulnerabilities related to firmware password |
|
| Access Control | Default system–wide security setting enforcement. | Unauthorized access can be gained by the threat agents using the vulnerabilities related to firmware password |
|
| Access Control | Using default configuration to displays a list of usernames at the console login prompt. | Unauthorized access can be gained by the threat agents using the vulnerabilities related to firmware password |
|
| Access Control | Using Password hints to help users recover their forgotten passwords. | Unauthorized access can be gained by the threat agents using the vulnerabilities related to firmware password |
|
| Access Control | Displaying restart, sleep and shutdown buttons on the login window | Unauthorized access resulting from social engineering type exploits | Unauthorized access to information and services |
| Access Control | No screensaver activation after a short period of inactivity, and/or NO password required to unlock the workstation. | Unauthorized access resulting from social engineering type exploits | Unauthorized access to information and services |
| Confidentiality | NetInfo filesystem running under default settings | Unauthorized access to any directory information from NetInfo domain Mac OS X client is bound to. |
|
| Confidentiality | Users allowed to use of Back to My Mac (BTMM) to connect to their machine from any other Mac Leopard based server over the Internet. | Unauthorized access to any directory information from NetInfo domain Mac OS X client is bound to. |
|
| Integrity | 'Target Disk Mode' means DAC can be circumvented on HFS+ volume by booting from device other than default boot device | Allow root–level access to HFS+ volumes. | Unauthorized information loss and disclosure |
| Integrity | Absence or improperly configured Anti Virus and /or malware prevention software installed on Mac OS desktop | Hackers can use this vulnerability to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information or initiate DoS type attacks | Unauthorized information loss and disclosure |
| Availability | Apache server installed on HFS+ volumes can be vulnerable to case–insensitive nature to HFS+ | Unauthorized access may result in malfunction through configuration changes | Misconfiguration leading to unavailability |
| Availability | Using default setting without disabling unused network interfaces such as Airport wireless interface | Unauthorized access may result in malfunction through configuration changes | Misconfiguration leading to unavailability |
| Availability | Weakness in the firewall settings leads to compromise the confidentiality, Integrity and availability of the workstation and its information assets. | Unauthorized access may result in malfunction through configuration changes | Misconfiguration leading to unavailability |
| Availability | Enabling share and control for remote desktops through VNC. | Unauthorized access may result in malfunction through configuration changes | Misconfiguration leading to unavailability |
| Availability | Using Bonjour, formerly known as Rendezvous is Apple's implementation of the ZeroConf protocol. It uses network broadcasts to advertise system services on the local subnet such as printers,iTunes, iChat, SSH and FTP etc. | Unauthorized access may result in malfunction through configuration changes | Misconfiguration leading to unavailability |
| Accountability | Unattended workstations with disabled systems password and screensaver (keychain) facilitates compromise to systems confidentiality, integrity and/or availability. | Unauthorized access gained through open shells or windows by threat agents using social engineering techniques | Loss of sensitive information |
| Accountability | 'out–of–box' setting with "NO" login banner at all points of entry to the system. | Unauthorized operations and access of resources | Loss of sensitive information |
| Accountability | Systems logging and auditing configuration set to default limits capability for adequate logging and incident management. | Host exploitation | Inadequate logging and audit data required to conduct a thorough forensic investigation. |
| Non–Repudiation | Using 'ypcat password' or 'nidump passwd' type exploits in NIS domain | Access to user accounts and password information | Impermissible as legal and complete evidence during forensic investigation |
| Non–Repudiation | 'Network time' not a default startup service | Audit and logging information lacks accurate time | Impermissible as legal and complete evidence during forensic investigation |
| Non–Repudiation | Using default keychain functionality allows users and applications to store and access authentication details in one place, including store and access private authentication credentials. The password for this keychain is the same as the login password and the keychain is automatically unlocked when a user logs in and is locked again upon logout. |
Audit and logging information lacks accurate time | Impermissible as legal and complete evidence during forensic investigation |
Table 3 below identify the vulnerabilities, threats and risks associated with WINDOWS OS.
Table 3: WINDOWS Security Services Vulnerabilities,Threats and Risks
| Security Services | Vulnerabilities | Threats | Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identification and Authentication | Weak/Non–existent account policies including local accounts as WINDOWS by default has 'blank or null' password on local administrator account |
|
|
| Identification and Authentication | Use of LANMAN password encryption |
|
|
| Identification and Authentication | Storing logon credentials in Cache |
|
|
| Authorization | Lack of review and hardening of minimum privileges required by users and local administrators | More privileges than required will lead to security issues related to compromised user or local administrator accounts |
|
| Access Control | Allowing Null Sessions, commonly referred to as 'Red Button' and used by core functions such as Windows Explorer requires anonymous connections to enumerate shares) | Leads to unauthorized access to information and resources such as usernames, groups, administrators, password change dates, account policy, trust relationships and lockout policy |
|
| Access Control | Weak / Non–existent Lock out Policies, including remote lockout of administrator accounts | Unauthorized access using "brute force" technique to gain access to information and resources |
|
| Access Control | Using default account named 'Administrator' | Default administrator account does not have any lockout enforced thus making them an easy target for 'Brute force' type attacks |
|
| Access Control | Default file and network access applied to anonymous users | Default administrator account does not have any lockout enforced thus making them an easy target for 'Brute force' type attacks |
|
| Access Control | Unrestricted DCOM access | Unauthorized users can change the security setting in the registry keys for DCOM objects to launch applications/malware |
|
| Access Control | Using default settings for 'recycle bin' | Unauthorized users can access deleted files from 'recycle bin' |
|
| Confidentiality | Weak/Non–existent account policies including local accounts as WINDOWS by default has 'blank or null' password on local administrator account | Weak passwords will expose the entire network to threats related to unauthorized access |
|
| Confidentiality | Using 'Temp Folder' for terminal services | Common folder used during the terminal services will allow unauthorized disclosure of data files located in shared location |
|
| Confidentiality | Temporary folders are not cleaned on exit | Data files left in temporary folders can be used by hackers to access sensitive information |
|
| Integrity | Lack of Antivirus and Malware protection on all desktops and/or or inconsistent use updated definition files for both | Publically known vulnerabilities can be exploited by external threat agents to gain unauthorized access |
|
| Integrity | Windows Messenger active on the desktop | Most anti–virus software don't scan the Windows messenger messages or files thus can be exploited by hackers to launch DoS or malware infection attacks | Loss of availability |
| Integrity | Automatic downloads and updates allowed for media players | Infected codes and other media files downloaded from the internet will result in platform consistency issues | Loss of availability |
| Integrity | Running Internet Explorer with following weak policy settings
|
Infected updates can be used by hackers to compromise the desktop OS integrity exposing the sensitive information on the network | Unauthorized disclosure; Loss of availability; Malfunction or operation error |
| Availability | Lack of implementation of service packs | Hackers/disgruntled employee can use this vulnerability to launch DoS attack | Loss of availability |
| Availability | Unlimited connections allowed to terminal server | Hackers/disgruntled employee can use this vulnerability to launch DoS attack | Loss of availability |
| Accountability | Desktop rollout with auditing switched off or with minimum auditing | Unauthorized access attempts will not be visible during the regular system security audits |
|
| Non–Repudiation | Inadequate security of audit logs | Insufficient logging and audit data can work to threat agents advantage as it minimizes the chances of them being tracked | Impermissible as legal and complete evidence during forensic investigation |
Annex C – Security Features Checklist for Operating Systems
Table 4 below lists, the recommended security features to mitigate the threats associated with LINUX OS.
Table 4: Security Recommendations – LINUX
| Security Category | Securing Guidelines | Recommendation Description | Threats Mitigated |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identification and Authentication | Account/Authentication Configuration |
|
Unauthorized access to sensitive security information |
| Identification and Authentication | User Account Security | Recommended Password Aging settings in '/etc/login.defs' are
|
Unauthorized access to sensitive security information |
| Identification and Authentication | Harden the GRUB/LILO |
|
Unauthorized access to sensitive security information |
| Authorization | File System Security |
|
|
| Authorization | File/Print Security | Disable WuFTPd tied to User File Transfer and Anonymous File Serving capabilities[6] |
|
| Authorization | File/Print Security | NFS Client Security for Transient and At–Boot File through configuration setting that include the trusted internal devices/desktops IP address in the '/etc/hosts.allow'. |
|
| Authorization | File/Print Security | SAMBA Security with respect to the requirement to run 'netfs' service on the desktop should be carefully evaluated as it extends the network share to the users of desktop. |
|
| Authorization | File/Print Security | It is recommended that SCP and SFTP services be disabled on desktops[7]. |
|
| Access Control | Firewall Configuration | Choose 'Medium' option for firewall configuration to restrict access to
|
|
| Access Control | Disallow Remote Root Login | Edit '/etc/secuetty' to restrict 'root' login to the local console. |
|
| Access Control | Disable CTRL–ALT–Delete[8] | Edit '/etc/inittab' to comment out the following line: 'ca:ctrlaltdel:/sbin/shutdown t3 r now' |
|
| Access Control | Password Protect Single–user Mode | Password Protect Single–user mode is used for system maintenance and hence provides root level access. It is recommended that this mode be password protected at all times. |
|
| Access Control | Locking System Accounts | Accounts used for system services and/or daemon should never be allowed to login interactively. |
|
| Access Control | Configure access to any enabled services | TCP Wrapper should be configured to deny everything except what is explicitly allowed. |
|
| Access Control | Scheduler Security | Xinetd should be disabled or removed unless telnet, rlogin, wu–ftpd or tftp is required to specifically support a business function on the desktop. |
|
| Access Control | Scheduler Security |
|
|
| Access Control | Web Security | Ensure Only necessary Modules are installed |
|
| Access Control | Web Security | Harden the Main Configuration File |
|
| Access Control | Web Security | Check Permission on Files in the Document Root |
|
| Access Control | Web Security | Encrypt Sensitive Traffic using HTTPS |
|
| Confidentiality | Verify no accounts have empty passwords | Perform search in '/etc/shadow' file for blank second field and all listed accounts should be locked or deleted. |
|
| Confidentiality | Miscellaneous Account Limits | Using Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) enforce the following controls on user accounts
|
|
| Confidentiality | Disable Sendmail Daemon Mode | It is recommended that the Sendmail daemon be disabled from all desktops by configuring the '/etc/sysconfig/sendmail' to include DAEMON=no |
|
| Confidentiality | DNS Security | Caching–only Nameserver |
|
| Confidentiality | DNS Security | Zone Hosting Service |
|
| Integrity | Applying Updates and Patches | It is recommended that all desktops be configured to use automatic updates via 'up2date' service. This service should be included in the startup services list. | Desktop Malfunction |
| Availability | Partitioning | Partition off directories that are most likely to be filled up by an attacker such as /var and /home. |
|
| Availability | Identify Services that should be started | Minimal set at startup should include the following services:
|
|
| Accountability | Verify No Accounts Have Empty Passwords | Perform search in '/etc/shadow' file for blank second field and all listed accounts should be locked or deleted. | Hackers |
| Accountability | Logging |
|
Hackers |
| Non–Repudiation | Purging Unnecessary Accounts | Remove all unnecessary user accounts and groups | Hackers and unauthorized users |
| Non–Repudiation | Logging | Configure the 'ntpd' to synchronize the system clock with your departments trusted time source(s) | Hackers and unauthorized users |
Table 5 below lists the recommended security features to mitigate the threats associated with Mac OS X.
Table 5: Security Recommendations Mac OS X
| Security Services | Security Guidelines | Recommended Description | Threats Mitigated |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identification and Authentication | Strengthen user password and account | Develop and strengthen the organisational password policy, adoption the following good practices is recommended:
|
Unauthorized access and disclosure of sensitive information. |
| Identification and Authentication | Remove unwanted user accounts | Disable the use of 'guest' accounts or use 'Parental Controls' to lock down 'guest' account permissions and access. | Unauthorized access and disclosure of sensitive information. |
| Authorization | Disable `root`user where possible | The use of "root" user is strongly discouraged, and it is recommended that installations should use of administrative users and "sudo". | Unauthorized access |
| Authorization | Harden DAC associated with owners and groups | Review and change so that only owners and groups have read access to the files in their home folders, public, sites and drop folders. This can be achieved using Default Umask and Access Control Lists (ACL) | Unauthorized access |
| Authorization | Enforce strong password on remote management | It is strongly recommended that a strong password is set before remote management is enabled; this prevents unauthorised access to the machine. | Unauthorized access |
| Access Control | Harden user accounts | Review default user account settings to remove all administrative access. |
|
| Access Control | Enforce Firmware Password | Enable Firmware Password[10] for all laptops where strict physical access controls are not possible. Firmware Password protection offers the ability to:
|
|
| Access Control | Strengthen system–wide security settings | It is recommended that following system–wide security settings be used to enforce a secure working environment:
|
|
| Access Control | Login Display lockdown and password hints | Disable displays a list of usernames at the console login prompt. |
|
| Access Control | Login Display lockdown and password hints | Disable Password hints across system–wide. |
|
| Access Control | Login Display lockdown and password hints | Disable restart, sleep and shutdown buttons on the login window. |
|
| Access Control | Enforce inactivity password | Enforce screensaver activation after 15 minutes of inactivity, and enforce required password to unlock the workstation. |
|
| Confidentiality | Use proper data encryption | Enable data encryption using File Vault and Disk utility per user basis as required to support business role. | Unauthorized data access or modifications |
| Confidentiality | Disable BTMM | Disable the use of BTMM to connect to their machine from any other Mac Leopard based server over the Internet (TCP port 443 and UDP port 4500). | Unauthorized data access or modifications |
| Confidentiality | File System and Sharing Security |
|
Unauthorized data access or modifications |
| Integrity | Up–to–date antivirus and malware protection | Ensure that OS is running latest Anti Virus and Malware detection software.
|
|
| Integrity | Secure install partition | Adopt use of UFS volume for all installs of Mac OS X |
|
| Integrity | OS Patching | Leave Software Update enabled and (optional) configure it to update daily instead of weekly. |
|
| Integrity | Enable and configure Firewalls | OS X includes two firewalls:
|
|
| Availability | Disable Bluetooth | As a hardening step, disable Bluetooth if it is not required as it adds to the overall security of the system. | Unauthorized access by hackers or unauthorized users |
| Availability | Harden Firewall access | Enable OS firewall. | Unauthorized access by hackers or unauthorized users |
| Availability | Remote Control lockdown | ONLY allow sharing and controlling remote desktops through VNC on per user basis as required. | Unauthorized access by hackers or unauthorized users |
| Availability | Lockdown Bonjour | Lockdown Bonjour or reduce the data being broadcast to discourage hackers. | Unauthorized access by hackers or unauthorized users |
| Accountability | Limit Administrator Logon | In the environment where there are more than one administrator on a system. The administrative users should be restricted from logging into the system from network services using their administrative accounts. This reduces the risk of authentication credentials being compromised. |
|
| Accountability | Login Banner | Enforce display of a login banner at all points of entry to the system, usually, login prompts on the desktop, shell logins and other application access prompts. Consult your organization's legal team for an appropriate login banner language. |
|
| Accountability | Enhance logging and auditing | Enhance default 'Logging and Auditing' setting to include the following:
|
|
| Non–Repudiation | Improve Logging security | Enhance the security of the "login" keychain by changing its password to something other than the login password. This ensures that the keychain has to be explicitly unlocked before any items can be accessed and also prevents keychain items from being accessed if the login credentials are compromised. | Unauthorized access |
Table 6 below lists the recommended security features to mitigate the threats associated with WINDOWS OS.
Table 6: Security Recommendations – Windows
| Security Services | Security Guidelines | Recommended Description | Threats Mitigated |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identification and Authentication | Strengthen password security | Adopt and implement strong password policy including the LOCAL accounts on desktops/laptops. Some suggestions for inclusion in the password policy are[11]:
|
|
| Identification and Authentication | Strengthen encryption of passwords | Disable the use of LANMAN password encryption to improve the strength of password hashes. |
|
| Identification and Authentication | Rename administrator account | Rename local account named 'Administrator' to enhance the security posture of the desktop environment |
|
| Identification and Authentication | Disable caching of logon credentials | Restrict the stored logon credentials to two or less |
|
| Authorization | Harden permissions on all user accounts |
|
Unauthorized access to information |
| Access Control | Disable Anonymous access | "Restrict Anonymous" should be enabled to prevent users from enumerating information related to network |
|
| Access Control | Enable User Lockout | Implement a strict Lock out policy that includes the following elements[12].
|
|
| Access Control | Restrict access to %SystemRoot% | Implement a strict ACL control on %SystemRoot% that is in line with minimum privileges required for applications to function efficiently |
|
| Access Control | Remove "Everyone" from any default file share permissions | Implement a strict ACL control on %SystemRoot% that is in line with minimum privileges required for applications to function efficiently |
|
| Access Control | Restrict DCOM access permissions |
|
|
| Access Control | Secure 'Recycle Bin' | It is recommended that the 'Recycle Bin' be configured to "remove files immediately when deleted". |
|
| Confidentiality | Strengthen user account policies | Strong password on local administrator account |
|
| Confidentiality | Disable 'Temp Folder' settings | Setting the 'Do not use temp folders per session' will mitigate the unauthorized disclosure of data files due to common folder during terminal session |
|
| Integrity | Up–to–Date Anti Virus and Malware protection | Implement Antivirus and Malware protection on all desktops and use updated definition files for both | Malfunctioning or operating errors |
| Integrity | Disable Windows Messenger on the desktop | It is recommended that Windows Messenger should be disabled If Windows Messenger is required for use internally a strict lockdown to prevent messenger from accessing internet from desktop |
Loss of availability |
| Integrity | Disable automatic downloads and updates for media players | Enable the "Prevent Codec Download" setting to mitigate the risks resulting in platform consistency issues | Loss of availability |
| Integrity | Strength Internet Explorer Policy Settings | It is recommended that following Internet Explorer settings be used:
|
Loss of availability |
| Availability | Up–to–date patch management |
|
|
| Availability | Restrict terminal server connection | Implement ONE terminal server session limit | Loss of availability |
| Accountability | Enhance auditing | Enable auditing with following options:
|
|
| Non–Repudiation | Secure audit and logging data |
|
Hackers and other external threat agents |
| Non–Repudiation | Define time synchronization settings | Enable Time synchronization with a secure and authorized time source as this is essential for auditing and authentication purposes | Hackers and other external threat agents |
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
- ACL
- Access Control List
- ANSI
- American National Standards Institute
- BSD
- Berkeley Software Distribution
- BTMM
- Back to My Mac
- CSEC
- Communications Security Establishment Canada
- CSG
- COTS Security Guidance
- DAC
- Discretionary Access Control
- DG
- Director General
- DNS
- Domain Name System
- DoS
- Denial of Service
- FTP
- File Transfer Protocol
- GC
- Government of Canada
- GID
- Group Identification
- GSP
- Government Security Policy
- HFS
- Hierarchical File System
- HID
- Host Intrusion Detection
- HTTP(S)
- Hypertext Transmission Protocol – Secure
- I&A
- Identification and Authentication
- IIS
- Internet Information Service
- IP
- Internet Protocol
- IPP
- Internet Printing Protocol
- IPSec
- Internet Protocol Secure
- IT
- Information Technology
- L2TP
- Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol
- LAN
- Local Area Network
- LDAP
- Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
- LINUX
- Unix–like open source operating system
- LPD
- Line Printer Daemon
- Mac
- Apple Macintosh operating system
- MD5
- Message Digest Version 5
- OS
- Operating System
- PC
- Personal Computer
- POP3
- Post Office Protocol 3
- RARP
- Reverse Address Resolution Protocol
- RBAC
- Role–Based Access Control
- SCSI
- Small Computer System Interface
- SHA
- Secure Hash Algorithm
- SMTP
- Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
- SNMP
- Simple Network Management Protocol
- SOW
- Statement of Work
- SSH
- Secure Shell
- SSL
- Secure Socket Layer
- TCP
- Transmission Control Protocol
- Telnet
- Telecommunication Network
- TFTP
- Trivial File Transfer Protocol
- UDP
- User Datagram Protocol
- UFS
- Unix File System
- UID
- User Identification
- WINDOWS
- Microsoft operating system
- X.509
- IEEE Standard for Digital Certificates
Notes
- [1] Only required if the desktop is required to support FTP services.
- [2] Only allow if the desktop is required to provide some type of file transfer capability for the user per business requirement.
- [3] Highly recommended for desktops with limited physical security.
- [4] In Mac OS X terms root–level access implies full access to all system resources and data.
- [5] Remote management makes use of the popular VNC server to allow users to connect to the Mac and works with other Open Source VNC clients.
- [6] Only required if the desktop is required to support FTP services.
- [7] Only allow if the desktop is required to provide some type of file transfer capability for the user per business requirement.
- [8] Highly recommended for desktops with limited physical security.
- [9] Development desktops will require soft limit rather than a hard limit.
- [10] Firmware security changes not explicitly endorsed by Apple may result in permanent damage to the computers logic board. Apple has released a graphical tool that sets the firmware password available on the installation disk.
- [11] Password management should follow the departmental / agency security policy or guideline.
- [12] System owners and administrators need to ensure compliance of lockout policy with organizations security policy.